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IN THE SUPPillME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
)

GALE

B~lEY

JUDD,

)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)
)

vs.

)

Case blo. 16332

)

ROlNLEY'S CHEP-RY HILL ORCHARDS, )
INC., a Corporation, and
)
E. W. ELF AWN TrJALL,
)

_________________________

)

Defendants-Respondents. ))

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATENENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff-appellant, Gale Barney
Judd, against the defendants-respondents, Rowley Cherry Hills
Orchards, Inc., a Corporation, and E. W.

Elf~Nn

Wall, to recover

damages for personal injuries she sustained as the result of a
head-on motor vehicle collision which occurred on July 20, 1977.
The parties will be referred to herein as they appeared
in the lower court.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOHER COURT
The trial of the case was held in the District Court of
Utah County on the 11th and 12th days of December, 1978, before
the Honorable J. Robert Bullock and a jury.

The case was

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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submitted to the jury on special verdict on December 12, 1973.
The jury found the defendants 70 percent negligent and the
plaintiff 30 percent negligent, and awarded special damages in
the amount of $15,000 and general damages in the amount of
$10,000, totaling $25,000.

The

co~rt

entered judgment on the

verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants
in the amount of $17,500, the jury a>vard having been reduced
by 30 percent.

The plaintiff made a timely Motion for a New

Trial on the following grounds:

(1) Irregularity in the pro-

ceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of
the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.

(2) Misconduct of the jury.

(3) Inadequate damages appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or nrejudice.

(4) Insufficiency of the

evidence to justify the verdict, or that it is against la1:v.
(5) Error in law.

The plaintiff also filed a Motion to Amend

Judgment by increasing the amount of both general and special
damages in the furtherance of justice.

The Hotion for a New

Trial was accompanied by the Affidavit of Stanford Judd to the
effect that three members of the jury appeared to be asleep at
various times during the proceedings.

The court entered its

Order denying plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial on February 6,
1979.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the judgment of the lower court
and the Order denying the Motion for a New Trial reversed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff was born December 31, 195(1 (R. 205), and
at the time of the collision involved in this lawsuit she had
57.7 years of reasonable life expectancy.

At the time of the

collision she was a licensed practical nurse employed by the
Payson Hospital (R. 208-209).

She was on her side of the road

traveling about 40 miles per hour when the defendants' truck
carne out of a dip into her view on her side of the road.

She

first saw the truck when it was about 300 feet away, immediately turned right and slammed on her brakes, and skidded into
the truck (R. 246-247).

The investigating officer, Lynn B.

Richardson, had been an officer of the Utah Highway Patrol for
ll years, during which time he investigated 60 or 70 accident
situations a year (R. 248).

When he arrived at the scene of the

accident both vehicles were still in the position they ended up
in as a result of the impact.
both vehicles (R. 250).

There were skidrnarks leading to

He took photographs of the scene of the

accident represented by Exhibits 3-13, and made a diagram represented by Exhibit 14 (R. 252).

He identified the skidrnarks from

the point of origin to the wheels of both vehicles (R. 255).
Defendants' vehicle laid down 67 feet of skidrnarks.

The officer

stated that the defendants' vehicle was completely on the wrong
side of the road at the point of impact (R. 256-259).

The skid-

marks made by plaintiff's vehicle were 79 feet in length to the
position of the front wheels, and the skidrnark laid down by the
left side of plaintiff's vehicle was 9 feet ll inches from the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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East edge of the highway where the skidmark began, and ll feet
7 inches from the East edge of the

high~vay

at the point of irr1pac:l

The roadway at the point of impact was 21 feet wide (R. 258).
The highway at the point where plaintiff's skidrnarks began was
18 feet 4 inches wide, and plaintiff was still on her side of
the road at that point (R. 267).
The witness Clay Barney testified of a conversation he
had with defendant Wall at the scene of the accident in which
the defendant Wall said that he just got confused and Hent the
wrong way.

The witness Barney described both vehicles as

being on the plaintiff's side of the road.

He was there when

the vehicles were removed away from each other and observed
the skidrnarks of both vehicles up to the point of impact.

The

skidmarks remained on the highway for a good month afterwards
(R 331).

He took pictures of the skidrnarks about 10 days

after the accident, which are Exhibits 40-44 inclusive.

The

dark spot across the middle between the skidrnarks shows where
water escaped from the broken radiators of the cars.

The

skidrnarks shown in Exhibit 40 were completely to the Hest side
of the highway (R. 333).
the

~vest

The defendant's skidmarks veered toward

and were completely on the Hest side of the highway

at point of impact (R. 334).

Exhibit 42 was taken ~vi th the wit·

ness looking South (the direction in which the plaintiff ,.;as
traveling).

This photograph shows the crest of the hill that

leads into the dip.

If you were in the dip you could not be

seen by a driver approaching from the North (R. 335).

Exhibi~-
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1

shows the angle of the defendant's approach to the point of
collision, and that the point of impact was on plaintiff's side
of the road (R. 336).

Exhibit 44 shows \-There plaintiff's car

was thrown by the force of the impact (R. 337).
The defendant Wall testified that he was driving about
30 miles an hour, that he first observed plaintiff's car as
it came on to the top of the hill, that both cars were in the
middle of the road at that time, that plaintiff's vehicle was
about 50 feet away when he first saw it, that he locked his
brakes and the cars collided in the middle of the road (R. 390391).

He described his procedure prior to impact as follows:

"Q. And as you were driving along this way, being familiar
with the area you knew that the approach of vehicles coming
from the other direction would not be visible to you until
you got near the crest of the hill, didn't you?
A. On that, I don't believe you paid that much attention
to it until that date come up and then you look over it
since.

Q.

But prior to that time you weren't paying much attention to that fact prior to that time?

A.

I was just going up the road.

Q. And even though you were in a dip in the road which
would prevent you from seeing on-coming traffic, you still
nroceeded in the middle of the road?
A. Had to have been the middle of the road, because
that's ~vhere I come through .....

Q.

And but you knew that you were in that dip where you
couldn't be seen by vehicles approaching the crest of
that hill, didn't you?

A.

I figured you could see a car until that day.

Q.

But you found out since you can't?

by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
A. Sponsored
Right."
(R.Law393-394).
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The defendant r..rall testified that there was no doubt that
the skidmarks shown on Exhibit 42 were laid down by his vehicle
(R. 395-396), and that skidmarks shown on Exhibits 40-42 were
made by the vehicles involved in the collision (R. 399-400).
He saw the skidmarks after the accident when he rode over the
road.

The defendant Wall testified that he pulled a little to

the left after he saw plaintiff's car when he applied his brakes
that he might have pulled a foot to the West, which was also
shown by the photographs (R. 404-405).
The witness Everett J. Kester testified that he removed
the vehicles from the point of impact.

He stated that the

vehicles were in the middle of the road but he did not attempt
to make any measurement from the skidmarks of either vehicle
with relationship to the edge of the road.

He observed that

the plaintiff's vehicle was tilted more toward the East (R. 412)
He said that the skidmarks were in the middle of the road at the
beginning and angled a small bit off to the West.

He just

1

I

generally glanced at the skidmarks left by the plaintiff's car

(R. 414).
The witness Carl J. Draper testified that when he arrived
1

at the scene of the collision both vehicles were basically in
the center of the road.

On cross examination he said he saw the'

police officer taking measurements (R. 416).
Newell Knight, of the Utah State High1vay Patrol, was
called as an expert witness by the defendants.

Counsel for t'le

defendants asked the witness to assume that the right side of
defendant Wall's pickup truck was 11 feet 5 inches from the East
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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edge of the surfaced road at the point of impact, and that the
left side of the plaintiff's automobile was 11 feet 7 inches
from the East edge of the roadway at that point; that the
pickup truck left 67 feet of skidmarks prior to impact, and the
plaintiff's vehicle left 79 feet of skidmarks prior to impact;
that at the beginning of the 67-foot skidmark the defendant
Wall's truck was 10 feet 3 inches from the East edge of the
roadway; that at the beginning of the plaintiff's 79-foot skidmark her vehicle was 9 feet 11 inches from the East edge of the
roadway; that the plaintiff's vehicle was traveling 40 miles
per hour and the defendant's pickup truck was traveling 30 miles
per hour (R. 429).

The witness charted the skidmarks on Exhibit 65

and also indicated by a solid line the assumed perception-reaction
distance.

The point of impact is represented on the Exhibit by

an "X", the beginning of skidmarks of each vehicle are represented
by a circle with a dot, the skidmarks are represented by a broken
line, and the perception distance is represented by a straight
line backward in each case from the commencement of the skidmark.
He computed the distance plaintiff traveled between perception
and skidmark at 75 feet, placing her 154 feet from point of
perception to point of impact, and the defendant's distance
traveled between perception and skidmark at 57 feet, placing
him 124 feet from point of perception to point of impact.
(R.

429-437).
The expert witness used the angles shown on the colored

slides (Exhibits 40-44) in charting the skidmarks of both
Vehicles on Exhibit 65 (R. 446-447).

The expert stated that you

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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can determine the angle at which a vehicle was traveling prior
7

to the application of the brakes.

This means that plaintiff

was in the process of turning to the right

~hen

she applied

the brakes, because the skidrnark proceeds on a slight angle
to the right to point of impact.

It also indicates that the

defendant Wall was turning left prior to the application of th,1
1
brakes, because his skidmark proceeds on an angle to the left
from application of brakes to point of impact (R. 429-437).
Discussing Exhibit 43 and the colored slides, the expert witne:l
said that the skidmarks indicated that the defendant's vehicle
was moving slightly to the left, and Exhibit 42 indicates that
the plaintiff's car was moving slightly to the right (R. 446).
This being true, the defendant only had to veer slightly to be
completely on the wrong side, and the plaintiff only had to
move slightly to be completely on her side.

The skidmarks of

both vehicles indicate an angle moving from East to tJest (R. 4)i
The witness Guy Nelson testified that he arrived at the
scene shortly after the accident occurred.

He indicated on

Exhibit 63 the position of the car and the truck when he arrived, the truck having been pulled off to the side (R. L21).
The witness Lloyd L.

Nelson arrived at the scene after

the defendant's truck had been moved and pulled away from point
of irr,pact, and made marks on Exhibit 63 inclicating the positiov
of the vehicles involved when he arrivec (R.422).
The witness Claude Rm·lley indicated on Exhibit 64 the
position of the vehicles ''her. he arrived at the scene (R. 62?).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
8 errors.

PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES
Plaintiff's head struck the windshield, causing a laceration
above the left brow which required stitches, and which left a scar
about an inch long.

The patella on her left knee was shattered

open and bleeding; her right ankle was open and bleeding and the .
bone was sticking out, her foot being turned in a 90 degree angle;
her right knee was torn and bleeding but not lacerated as severely
as the left (R. 216).

A neck brace was put on her at the scene

of the accident, and she was removed to the Payson Hospital, where
they stitched her face and forehead, removed some of the fragments
from her left kneecap, and wired the two largest ones together
and stitched

them up.

They took the fragments out of her right

knee and wired the two largest pieces together, and manipulated
her ankle into place (R. 217-218).

She was discharged from the

Payson Hospital August 10, and readmitted for treatment of an
infection in her left knee (R. 219).
When asked about the pain she suffered from the time of
the accident up until the present time, she stated, "Well, it
was awful because I couldn't do anything; because I wasn't used
to being waited on."
tinually.

She has required medications for pain con-

She had a cast on her right leg from the top of her

thigh to her toes for three weeks.

She had a brace on her left

leg so that they could keep treating her infection (R. 220).
She returned to work the first time after the accident
in January 1978, for one or two days a week, and sometimes she
couldn't do that.

She increased her time at work as much as

she could.
ItS.J. was
forprovided
herby the
toInstitute
do ofher
without
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pain and problems (R. 226).
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On July 10, 1978, she was admitted to Utah Valley Hospi:l
for surgery on her left knee by Dr. Chapman (R. 222).

The pur.

pose of the surgery was to remove her patella because it was
jagged and grinding against her joint, and had caused her much
suffering and pain and problems.

She described the condition

in her left knee prior to her surgery as follows:
"Well, just ivhen I'd walk or stay on my feet, the normal
thing you do. And when I'd even be sitting I couldn't
sit because -- with my feet bent because it would just,
it would irritate it constantly, because the way he -the way the patella was wired together, the two pieces,
there was a jagged part against my joint, and every
time my knee would move it would irritate it."
Prior to the operation on July 10, 1973, she stated thatl
while working she would have to be careful the way she stepped o:
her knee would totally give out under her, and her knee wouldgi
out when she tried to do normal household duties.

She had trou::

performing her household duties, her knee hurt even while she :i<'
sitting down, and she would have to move it to different positic
to prevent spasms from occurring (R. 227-228).
After the operation of July 10, 1978, she had to wear
a cast, extending from the middle of her upper leg to just above
the ankle, for 2-1/2 months (R. 228).
return to v7ork after that operation.

She was never released to
\Vhen asked what she could

do, at the time of the trial, she stated that the performance

J

her household duties caused her discomfort, she couldn't be on
her feet for a standard length of time, she vras lioi ted in the
help she could give her husband in his farming activities.
to the accident she played softball and football.

She was on

r:'

girls' basketball team in high school as a regular fonvard, she
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was on the girls' athletic track team in hgih school, and ran
the 440 and mile in inter-school competition (R. 229-231).

Prior

to the accident she jogged a mile every night or day (R. 232).
Prior to the accident she ran a mile in 6.49, but most of the
time she would do it in 7 minutes.

She had engaged in horseback

activities all her life, riding her registered Appaloosa mare in
barrel racing and pole bending at various horse shows, riding
club events, and rodeos (R. 233).

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 is a

photograph of her participation in a barrel racing event (R. 234).
She usually rode her horse five times a week -- to head and cut
cattle on the farm, for riding club practice, and for riding with
the family up on the mountain for pleasure.

Since the accident

her knees give her trouble when her feet are in the stirrups. She
has tried to ride her horse about eight times since the accident,
but it hurts her even with her feet hanging out of the stirrups.
She can't lope or gallop the horse because it hurts her knees.
She last rode her horse in October (R. 235).

Prior to the

accident she enjoyed snow skiing, water skiing, and dancing.
Plaintiff demonstrated to the jury her difficulty in
sitting down on a chair and getting up from a seated position to
a standing position.

She was required to extend her left leg

when she went to sit down, and also when she went to stand.
can't put any bend in her knee (R. 231).

She

She has some discomfort

every time she proceeds to a sitting position, or rises from a
sitting position to a standing position.
a spiral brace on her left knee (R. 237).

She was still wearing
She has no kneecap on
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the left leg, and the scarring extends from the side leg below
the knee on an irregular course to the top of the knee.

i

She

stated that this was open wide when the accident happened.

She

said that these scars on her knees bother her, and she doesn't
wear short dresses.

She exhibited scars on her right knee exte:·.

ing four or five inches long.

There is a permanent scar in her

right ankle area about the size of a quarter or half dollar whit
bothers her.

The right ankle causes her trouble at the present

time, which worsens when it is cold.

It always has a little sha.

pain in it if she turns her foot wrong (R. 239).

Eversion and

inversion movements of the right ankle bother her.

Walking or

shopping activity for an extended period of time causes her rig:.·.
ankle to ache at the present time.

Her left knee aches all the

time, but the right doesn't ache as much (R. 240).
Plaintiff states that she can't run or do hardly anythin1
as she would like to do it.

She has difficulty climbing stairs.

She always has to take her left foot forward and keep it s traig1:
because she feels it will collapse on her if she doesn't.

In

climbing stairs she cannot alternate the right and left foot.
Going upstairs she has to use her right foot first, and going
downstairs she has to use her left foot first so that the left
leg always stays straight (R. 241).

On occasions when she gets

down on the floor to relax or perform work, she has to maneuver
herself to a couch or chair or cupboard -- something

s~e

can

grasp on to -- and bend her right knee and keep her left knee
straight while getting up (R. 242).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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When asked if she had a desire to return to her work as
a licensed practical nurse if she were able to perform that work,
she answered yes and that she really enjoyed the work.

If she

were able to do so, she would like to pursue her activities as
an l.p.n. indefinitely, as that is what she went to school for

(R. 243-244).
Dr. David Cannon Flinders, a physician with specialized
training in family practice (R. 270), examined the plaintiff in
the hospital emergency room immediately after the accident.

He

described her injuries as follows:
"Okay. At the time I saw her in the emergency room, she
had several injuries. She had some swelling around her
left temple just above her ear and extending midway back
on her skull. She had about a one and a half inch laceration or cut across her forehead. She had some bruising
and swelling of her shoulder on the left side ...... And
there was no obvious deformity or fracture of that
shoulder. She had dressings over both of her knees, some
sterile gauze to protect the areas from infection. I did
not remove those dressings at that time. I was told that
one could see the underlying bone through the dressings.
And since it was apparent that that was a surgical problem,
I ordered X-rays of those areas and then later removed the
dressings in the operating room. And then, further, she
had an obvious deformity of her right ankle. The right
ankle was bent at almost 90 degrees to the leg, and there
was a little small hole penetrating the right ankle."
(R. 272).
Surgery was subsequently performed by Dr. John Mendenhall,
an orthopedic surgeon attached to the Payson Hospital (R. 273).
Dr. Flinders participated jointly with Dr. Mendenhall in the postoperative recovery, which was complicated by fever and infection
in the left knee, for the treatment of which plaintiff was readmitted to the Payson Hospital on September 20, 1977 (R. 274).
She continued to complain of persistent pain in her left knee,
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and medications were prescribed for relief of pain and reductio:!
of inflammation. On various examinations in follow-up care she
appeared to be in pain and discomfort.

She had an obvious

limp in her left knee at times and continued to complain of
pain (R. 276).
Dr. John Paul Mendenhall, an orthopedic surgeon (R. 284), I
testified that he examined the plaintiff at the Payson Hospital

I

on July 20, 1977, and took X- rays of the plain tiff (Exhibits 16-:j
He stated that the X-ray of plaintiff's right foot shmved the
foot twisted at least 90 degrees and the joint of the mid-foot
had come apart, with only one bone of the mid-foot just beloH
the ankle in its proper position.

He stated that this type of

injury was serious because:
"The bone that is found in the body just beyond the mid
shin bone of the leg has unusual blood supply, because
the majority of its surfaces are involved in joint motion,
and it is very easy for the blood supply to the bone to
be interrupted, and the bone subsequently dies with the
decreased blood supply to the area. It is also easy for
infection. It is our medical experience that dislocations
in this area often result in early arthritis.

Q.

What's the significance of that? If early arthritis
sets in, what's the significance of that?

A. The patients frequently have loss of motion as well
as pain." (R. 287) ...... "The common procedure is to do
surgery and obliterate the joints so that the bones become
attached one to the other, and then the joints aren't
present to give the pain .....
Q.
Hait. Pardon me, Doctor. Before I leave that, I did
want to ask you this: Would this type of an injury have
a tendency to produce pain in a patient with or without
the fusing of the foot at the time that she ~ad it?

A.

Yes.

These are extremely painful.

Q.

And would these have a tendency to give her orcblems
for an indefinite period of time with respect to"paln and
discomfort?
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A. It's a common experience in a medical practice, in
an orthopedic practice, to observe patients who have
dislocated subtalar joints to have pain subsequently.

Q.

And is an injury of this type susceptible to arthritis
or arthritic involvement?

A. That's correct." (R. 288). " ..... There are two
reasons why the question of arthritis is high in this
type of an injury. One is the healthy cartilage would
receive severe violence or the foot would not come off
in -- Another thing is that the circulation is impaired
and that the cartilage is not healthy. And the other one
is that the joints are all interrelated, and if the one
of them wears in a -- and then the wear is then perpetuated to the adjacent joint. It is common for the three
joints that were dislocated here to be thought of as one
unit, and injury to one frequently results in an injury
to all three." (R. 289).
Dr. Mendenhall stated that Exhibit 17 showed that the
patella of plaintiff's left knee was in several pieces, and that
fractures of this type frequently become infected, are more
difficult to heal, and require more aggressive surgical treatment.
Exhibit 19 is an X-ray of the right knee which also shows a
comminuted fracture of the patella (R. 289-290).

He justified

his surgical procedure in attempting to preserve the patella of
the left knee as follows:
"It is my professional op~n~on that heroic attempts
should be made to preserve patellas, and at this point
in my medical practice I have not excised one or discarded the complete patella. I feel that it is proper
medicine to do everything possible to preserve the kneecap
for several reasons: one is it has importance as far as
the ability to straighten the knee in that it gives a
mechanical advantage to the kneecap. It alsa has
benefit as far as its appearance. It is, my feeling
is supported by the fact that a great deal of research
has gone into prosthesis, an artificial patella, so
that proper orthopedics dictates that very heroic measures
are taken before a kneecap is removed."
He stated that the patella was important
"Because of the levers that it applies and the mechaniby the S.J. Quinney
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are more efficient and can straighten the lee better,
which is useful in kneeling, climbing stairs, many
functions of both daily living as well as it's important athletically.

Q. Even is beneficial to operation of the thigh
muscles, you say, to have the protection of the patella?
A.

That is correct."

He stated that all bending of the knee to some degree would be
affected by the rerr.oval of the patella (R. 292).

Dr. Mendenhall!

described the surgical procedures he performed as foll01i7S:
"The patient was taken to the operating rcorn, and the
scrubbing 1i7as done to the surface of both lower limbs,
after which sterile sheets and drapes, cloth as well
as paper and plastic, were applied. A large amount
of fluid was used to wash out the knees as well as the
ankle. Force was applied to the foot, meaning that
the foot was pulled in a vigorous manner until the bones
came back into place, after which more irrigation was
done and loose stitches were put in the skin. A dressing
was then pla.ced over the ankle. The sarre procedures v1ere
then done to the knee in that a large amount of irrigational water was used to wash out all pieces of dirt,
small pieces of bone, cartilage, and any foreign material.
Small pieces of bone that were not well attached were
discarded, and the two largest pieces of kneecap were
joined together by taking heavy wire, passing it through
drill holes and twisting it on itself until jt stuck the
major pieces together. The under-surface of the kneecap
was inspected to see that the pieces were in reasonable
position. Additional irrigatio:n was done. The skin on
the right knee was closed with stitches. The skin on the
left knee was closed except a rubber rube v1as placed in
the knee coming out through the skin and out into the
dressing, dressings were applied, and strips of plaster
were laid down the back side of both lower limbs."
The plaintiff later developed an infection in ber left
knee which Has difficult to treat (R. 296) .
Dr. Eugene Chapman has practiced orthopedic surgery
since 1955 (R. 300).

He examined the plaintiff on June J 9' 1q 7t.

at his office in Provo.

At that time his clinical ex<nnjnaticr
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"showed that she had a transverse scar across the
right patella and an oblique scar o~ the anterior
~spect of the left knee.
Range of motion of the right
knee was normal. The left knee lacked 20 degrees of
complete flexion, and there was no ligament instability.
There were scars on the lateral aspect of the right
ankle. There was normal dorsaflection and plantarflection, meaning up and down motion of both ankles;
but she lacked 50 percent of inverse and everse motion,
meaning in and out motion of the right ankle as compared to the left ..... The lack of motion in inversion and eversion reduces the agility ... of what we
call the midtarsal area, meaning the mid-ankle area,
and it is usually due to some underlying injury to
the joint called the subtalar joint, which is just
below the ankle, a sign of fibrosis around the joint
and arthritis." (R. 301-302).
Exhibit 30 is an X-ray taken by Dr. Chapman at his office
on June 19, 1978, of plaintiff's right ankle and foot.

He testi-

fied that this X-ray showed some arthritic change near the talarnavicular joint and some narrowing of the subtalar joint, indieating hastened arthritis of these joints due to the injury.

He

stated that his examination of the original films disclosed a
severe injury of the talarnavicular and subtalar joints that
would cause traumatic arthritis in those joints (R. 304).
Dr. Chapman also took X-rays of the plaintiff's knees
(Exhibits 31-37).

After examining these various X-rays, Dr.

Chapman decided on the initial visit of the plaintiff that she
would be better off with the left patella removed than with
leaving it in, because of the marked roughness seen on the
X-rays, and the tenderness and limited motion.

She was admitted

to the Utah Valley Hospital on July 9, 1978, where surgery was
performed on July lOth, removing the patella of the left knee
and making plastic re~air of the exterior mechanism (R. 306-307).
ne described
OPeration
as for
follows:
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"The day after admission on July lOth she ;.;as given a
general anesthetic, and with proper cleansing of the
knee I did an incision in the knee, and preserved the
ligaments of the extensor mechanism, but removed the
kneecap. And I examined the kneecap, and the marked
irregularity and roughness was confirmed by direct
investigation that was seen on X-ray. I did then an
overlapping repair taking the four corners of the cut
in the ligament and repairing them in an overlapping
manner to create a fibrous type of patella, and then
closed the wound and a cast was applied." (R.308).
He testified that activities such as bending either knee
or standing too long, would have a tendency to produce or incre1
pain, and that pain is increased by a variety of activities, 1k.:
cause the joints to move and the more often and repeated they
have to move, the more the pain and disability.

After the

operation he applied a cast from the upper groin down to just
above the ankle (R. 309).

When the cast was removed on Septem·

ber 7th plaintiff was told to still use crutches and gradually
increase the weight on her foot, depending on the feeling of
increase-d strength, but cautioned against falling.
on a weight lifting regimen (R. 310).

She was put

In describing the reason

for the patellectomy, Dr. Chapman stated:
"I'm very reluctant to remove a patella and in the
average case may wait months or years of conservative
care, see if the patella can regenerate, and do an
intermediate operation to see if that will be sufficient, such as shaving the patella; which, by the way,
I think she requires on her right knee. But this one
I think was so irregular that in my mind there was no
question but that it required removal." (R.311).
Dr. Chapman testified that plaintiff vlOuld have permaner:
partial impairment of both knees and of the midtarsal area of
the right ankle due to the original auto accident injuries.
stated:
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"I believe she has 30 percent loss of function of the
right foot and ankle, 20 percent loss of function of
the right knee, and 30 percent loss of function of the
left knee. These figures were arrived at after a recent
examination of December 6, 1978 ..... According to my
tables, the 30 percent impairment in the right ankle
translates to 8 percent impairment of body function,
the 20 percent in the right knee translates to 7 percent
body function, the 30 percent impairment of the left
knee translates to 11 percent body function -- making
a total of 26 percent loss of bodily function attributable to both knees and the right ankle." (R. 311-313).
Dr. Chapman also testified that plaintiff would have
trouble performing many of the tasks of a licensed practical
nurse, especially if it is a full work day, and he would encourage her to try to get lighter work in her own field such as a
hospital assignment to something lighter, or perhaps retrain to
something in a different field (R. 313) .

He stated that she

would suffer arthritis in the joints involved, that her condition
would remain about the same as the current estimate.

He testified

that further surgery would be required on plaintiff's right knee,
consisting of a patellar shave, a smoothing of the patella, with
a view to reducing the pain in the knee which without the surgery
would progress to become worse (R. 314).

Such a procedure would

require a hospitalization of 5 or 6 days, and the cost of such
procedure for medical and hospital treatment would be about ten
percent less than the patellectomy.

He stated that he would not

recommend that plaintiff participate in any sports that involved
running or jogging, as that would hasten the wear of the joints,
that she should get her exercise in some non-weight-bearing type
of exercise such as swimming with the arms, and letting the legs
kick as their tolerance allowed (R. 315).

He would not recommend
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any physical activity which would require the plaintiff to be
on her knees, stating that kneeling is especially bad for an
abnormal knee (R. 316).

"Q. Would you anticipate that she would have difficulty
with her knees in the condition that they are now in and
on a permanent basis in coming to a seated position from
a standing position and from a standing position to a
seated position? Would it require any special maneuvering of her lower extremity, either one, in this sort of
activity?
A. A person with an abnormal arthritic knee would tend
to stiffen a little while sitting and would have to
work out that stiffness as he got up from the chair, he
or she; and also this lack of mechanical advantage that
occurs when a person does not have a patella would weaken
the extensor strength, although I try to overcome that
partially by creation of the fibrous patella." (R. 317).
On cross examination Dr. Chapman stated that plaintiff had read<
a fixed state of impairment on December 6, 1978, when he last
examined her, and that in certain situations if she practices

sh1

may be able to walk without a limp but in other hurried-up situa·
tions a limp would show up again (R. 318).
Dr. Edward Spencer, an orthopedic surgeon, testifying for
the defendant, stated that when he examined plaintiff on Septem·
ber 29, 1978, she had limited motion in her left knee, atrophyo'
the muscles in the thigh and calf, surgical scars over the left
knee and left ankle.

She had motion over the right kneee and

small crepitus in the left formover of the right knee, and some
ligament instability in the left knee (R. 355).

He stated that

he felt the anterior cruciate ligament had been torn or at leas'
stretched beyond its limit (R. 356).

He described the functian

of the patella as follows:
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"Basically the patella serves as a lever arm, and that
just means that it makes the muscles, the thigh muscles
that attach to it up this direction function more
effectively. It's like a crane with a bonm in the
crane, acts as a lever to give you advantage in lifting
a heavy object or a rock. Because of the position of
the kneecap holding the ligament away from the surface
of the knee, it adds to the strength of the knee. So
particularly as you bring the knee into a full extension
or into full flexion it will add to the strength of the,
or add to the effectiveness of the, muscles. The muscles
are required to pull about two and a half times their
normal body weight when the knee is bent this much,
and without kneecap supporting it it loses some of its
efficiency. Similarly, the last two degrees of extension from here to there are again you need the kneecap
to make it more efficient to be able to do that. The
muscles by themselves have to work much harder if they
don't have that kneecap to assist it."
Dr. Spencer testified that her ability to run, or to engage in
competitive athletic activity or in sports that required a lot
of knee work, would be impaired (R. 359).

He thought she would

be able to perform the work of an l.p.n. with some restriction,
that she could expect after a long day's work pain in her knee
and swelling.

He said she had permanent impairment in her left

knee but he didn't think she had permanent impairment in her
right knee or right ankle.

He anticipated that there was a

possibility of impairment in her right knee in the future.

He

testified that plaintiff would have an 18 percent permanent
disability of the body as a whole as a result of the automobile
accident (R. 362), but in arriving at that figure he did not
attribute any permanent disability whatsoever to the right ankle.
At that time he was not aware of the extent of the dislocation
of the ankle joint at the time of the accident (R. 364).

Never-

theless, with respect to plaintif's right foot, the witness gave
the following
testimony:
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"Q. Was this a severe enough type of injury that would
incline you to expect some future development of arthritic change?
A. You bet. There is a high incidence of arthritis
in this subtalar joint that develops after one such
dislocation; very frequent.

Q.

And that's a frequent situation?

A.

(The witness nodded his head.)

Q. And sometimes that could progress to the point
where it would be necessary to perform a triparthrodesis?
A.

Yes, i f it's painful and debilitating." (R. 365-366).

The doctor was asked the following question:

"Q. Is it important in your post-operative, after you
perform an operation say for the removal of a patella,
which was performed on this patient on July the lOth
of last year, would it be helpful to you to continue
to observe that patient to see how she Has responding
to that operation?
A. Surely. I think it's certainly a disadvantage to
one time see an individual and try and appreciate how
they accommodate to things .....

Q. Hell, would this be useful as a matter of practice
before you came to a final judgment as to the degree
of impairment?
A.

I think it would, yes." (R. 367).
The witness, Carol Lynn Lastowski, testified that she

1·1as

a nurse in charge of the surgical floor of the Payson Hospital,
and the plaintiff worked under her supervision (R. 322).

She

described the duties of an 1. p. n. , which are set forth in Exhibi[

30, stating that an l.p.n. ,.;ras expected to perform each and all
of the duties set forth in the Exhibit.

\men asked about the

quality of work performed by the plaintiff, the \vitness stated:
"Gale was very considerate and kind to 1)atients. '.men
Gale was given an assignment we didn't ~ave to check
up on her and follow to see that it was done. If she
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was told to do something, we knew that it was done and
that the patient was taken care of.

Q. Will you state whether she required an extensive
or a minimum of supervision in the performance of her
duties?
A.

Minimum." (R. 325).

When asked about plaintiff's difficulty in performing her work
after the accident, the witness testified as follows:
"It was a few days [after] Gale asked me if she could
go home early because her legs did bother her, that
they did hurt, and that she had had to take a pain pill,
and that she didn't want to, you know, be around the
patients after, you know, taking a pain pill. And she
missed approximately four days of work because of it.
And she'd call in and say that her knees, at that time
she just didn't feel like she could perform her duties.
We tried to at various times when we could see that
her legs were bothering her, excuse me, then we tried
to give her a little lighter load than what we normally would.

Q.

Would you state whether or not you'd be permitted
to do this as an indefinite or continuous practice?

A. Not as an indefinite practice, no, sir, not in the
field that we worked." (R. 326).
LOSS OF EARNINGS
In 1977 the plaintiff lost 8 working days in July, 23 days
in August, 23 days in September, 21 days in October, 22 days in
November, 10 days in December up to the 14th -- making a total of
107 days or 856 hours at $3.47 an hour (R. 344-345).

She first

went to work after the accident around January 15, 1978, and
after she first started there were periods when she would be
unable to work at all, and times when she worked a modified shift.
There were times when other l.p.n. 's took over some of h.er responsibilities even while she was at work because she could not
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perform them.

During all of this time she required prescripticri

to help her get through the day (R. 346).

She has not been

released to perform any work since admission to the Utah Valley
Hospital on July 9, 1978.

On August 1, 1978, her pay scale was

increased to $4.32 per hour (R. 347-348).
Plaintiff's undisputed loss of earnings suffered to the
date of the trial are computed as follows:
July 20, 1977 to Dec. 14, 1977
(856 hours at $3.47 per hour) ....... $ 2,970.32
Dec. 14, 1977 to Jan. 15. 1978
(184 hours at $3.47 per hour) .......

538.28

July 10, 1978 to Aug. 10, 1978
(184 hours at $3.47 per hour)

638.28

•••

0.

0

0

Aug. 10, 1978 to Dec. 10. 1978
(736 hours at $4.32 per hour) .......

3,179.52
$ 7,426.40

ARGUMENT
POINT

1

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY
THE SUBMISSION OF THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY.
Plaintiff laid down skidrnarks that were 79 feet long,
with the beginning of the skidrnark of her left side being 9 feec
ll inches West of the East edge of the road, the end of her
left-hand skidrnark being ll feet 7 inches West of the East edge
of the road at the point of impact; whereas defendant's vehicl 1
laid down 67 feet of skidrnarks, \vith his right side skidrnar!<
measuring 10 feet 4 inches from the East edge of the 21-foot
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road at the beginning of the skidmark, which skidrnark veered left
approximately 1 foot to 11.5 feet from the East edge of the road
at the point of impact.

Ey the defendant Wall's evidence, the

right side of defendant's truck lacked only 2 inches of being
completely on plaintiff's side of the road at the time the
defendant Wall applied his brakes, and the right side of defendant's truck, veering on a slight angle to the left, was 1 foot
3 inches over the center of the road at the point of impact
(Exhibits 40-44, Exhibit 54, R. 428-431).

The highway at the

beginning of plaintiff's skidmarks was 18 feet 4 inches wide
(R. 267), so that plaintiff was completely on her side of the
road when she applied her brakes.

Even if the highway were

21 feet wide at that point, her left wheels would have been
only 7 inches to the left of the center at that time.
Exhibits 40-44, the correctness of which was admitted
by the defendant Wall (R. 395-396, R. 399-400), clearly show
that both plaintiff and defendant were completely on plaintiff's
side of the narrow road at the point of impact.

Defendant Wall

testified that the skidmarks shown on those Exhibits were made
by the vehicles involved in the collision, that he saw those
skidmarks after the accident when he rode over the road (R.399-400),
and that t~ere was no doubt that the skidrnarks shown on Exhibit 42
were laid down by his vehicle.

The slight angle of the approach

of both vehicles to the point of impact is clearly indicated by
the photographs in evidence.

Indeed, the defendants' expert

witness followed this angle in his preparation of Exhibit 65.
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It is significant that whereas the left Hheels of plaintiff's
vehicle would have been just left of center when she applied
her brakes (even if the road were 21 feet wide at that point,
which it was not), the right v7heels ·of defendant's truck were
only 2 inches from the center when he applied his brakes, and
moved to the left approximately 1 foot to the point of in:pact.
In this respect the defendant \.;all's testimony again confiil!ls
the accuracy of the officer's measurements.
It is true that some witnesses testified for the defend- I
ants that the vehicles after the collision appeared to be in
the middle of the road.

1

None of these witnesses saw the acci-

dent; none of them paid any particular attention to the skichmk!
none of them disputed the existence of the skidmarks; none of
them disputed the correctness of the photographs; none of the!!'
disputed the accuracy of the measurements of the skidrnarks made
by the investigating officer; and there was no center line on
the freshly oiled and treated road.

The skidmarks remained

clearly visible on the highway for a good month after the acci·
dent (R. 331).

Indeed, the photographic Exhibits 40-44 were

taken about ten days after the accident.

During all of this

time the defendant Wall and his witnesses could have checked
the accuracy of the investigating officer's measurements had
they desired to do so.

The slight angle of the vehicles at the

point of collision caused the rear end of pl~intiff's vehicle
to be fish-tailed over the center of the road by the force o:
the impact, as shown by the photographs taken by the investigvr·
ing officer,
this
n'ay
explain
\vitnesses'
conclusions
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t':fl

the vehicles involved were in the middle of the road.

This

unsupportable conclusion, which is contradicted by the factual
evidence and by the testimony of the defendant driver himself,
did not constitute believable evidence upon which the jury
could base a finding of contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff.
The defendants' expert witness charted on Exhibit 65
the skidmarks of both vehicles using the angles indicated by
the photographs, and his conclusions were that the plaintiff
at the time of perception had to turn slightly to her right to
be completely on her side of the narrow road at the time of
the impact, while the defendant just had to turn slightly to
his left to be completely on the wrong side of the road at the
time of impact.
Section 41-6-54, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides
that drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions
shall pass each other to the right and each driver shall give
to the other at least one half of the main traveled portion of
the roadway as nearly as possible.

Plaintiff fully complied

with her statutory duty by yielding more than half of the road
to the defendant driver.

The defendant driver clearly breached

his statutory duty by moving to the left rather than to the
right, even though he was already substantially intruding upon
plaintiff's space.
It is significant that while plaintiff was properly
maneuvering to\vard the right and conforming to her statutory
responsibility of yielding half of the roadway to the defendant
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Wall, the defendant Wall on the other hand was violating his
statutory duty and negligently maneuvering his vehicle to the
left prior to braking, thus assuring an impact completely on
plaintiff's side of the road.
It is also significant that before corning into the view
of plaintiff's car, the defendant Wall was traveling in a dip
which obscured his presence to approaching vehicles, and where
the plaintiff could not see him but where he knew himself to be, i
and where he could not see the plaintiff, so that the defendaru

I

j

Wall was recklessly traveling blind as far as approaching traffiq
was concerned, almost completely on the wrong side of the road,
when the drivers of the vehicles came into each other's view.
The record is completely devoid of one fact of believable
evidence which would support a finding of contributory negligenc1
by the jury, or which would warrant the submission of that issue
to them, and it is crystal clear that the defendant Wall's
negligence was the sole proximate cause of the collision.

Had I
I

he occupied his side of the road within the obscurity of the dip I
or had he maneuvered to the right to yield half of the roadway I
I
to the plaintiff as the statute required, there would have been I
no collision.

It was therefore error for the court to have

refused plaintiff's peremptory charge to the jury (plaintiff's
requested instruction No. 4) removing the issue of contributorv
negligence from their consideration, and it was error to give
the various instructions and special verdict form which allo,,,,ec
the jury to speculate about that issue.

This error having been
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I
I

called to the court's attention by a timely motion for a new
trial, it was error for the trial court to deny that motion.

POINT

2

THE COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE
PLAINTIFF IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NOS. 1, 6, 7, AND 9,
AL'TD IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT
THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS
A MATTER OF LAW.
It may be urged that the jury, having found the defendants
negligent in the verdict which it rendered, cured any error in
the instruction given and in the failure to give plaintiff's
requested instruction.

However, it is reasonable to assume that

the jury, feeling authorized under the court's instructions to
find that the defendants were not negligent, may have been
inclined to assess a smaller percentage of negligence against
the defendants; and the jury may also have considered the plaintiff less negligent than the 30% which were assessed to her.
The defendant Wall admitted that he was in the middle of
the road when his vehicle was hidden within the dip where he
could neither see nor be seen by opposing traffic, which was
unaware of his position.

Under these conditions it was impera-

tive that he drive his vehicle on the right half of the roadway,
and reasonable care would require him to do so.

That the plain-

tiff was entitled to a granting of her request in instruction
:Jo. 1 has been so generally long established in this and other
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Had the defendant Wall either remained on his side of th
road or returned to his side of the road after perception, the
accident would not have occurrec.

Clearly the defendant \;/all

was guilty of negligence as a matter of law in failing to maintain a proper lookout, in failing to drive his vehicle on the
right half of the roadway, and in failing to keep his vehicle
under proper control; and plaintiff's requested instructions to
this effect should have been given.

See Ferguson v. Jonesma,

10 Utah 2d 179, 350 Pacific 2d 404, VJhich held it was ?rejudicia:
1

error for the trial court to refuse to give the plaintiff's
requested instruction on his theory of the case.

The jury

should not have been permitted to speculate upon the issue of
the defendants' negligence or to find that defendants were not
solely responsible for the collision.

The defendant :•Tall cannot

excuse himself from an emergency situation Hhich
his owr1 negligence.

<Jas

created by

If he had maintained a reasonable lookout,

he would have seen the plaintiff in time to make the reasonable
maneuver of his vehicle to the right, even though he was then
negligently operating his vehicle on the wrong side of the ro~
POINT

3

THE TRIAL COUR':' ERRED IN GIVIl!G

niST~UCTIO:~

NO. 6 TO THE JURY.

As previously set forth in the brief, the plaintiff
entitled to have the negligence of the

defenda~ts

~as

determined as

a matter of lmv, and the issue of contributory ne<?lige"'.ce
Instruction 'lo. 6 allm·1ed t~.e

have been removed from the jury.
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I
I

four grounds set forth in the instruction.

The court's instruc-

tion No. 6 adopted verbatim the defendants' requested instruction,
1vhich was lifted out of JIFU Section 21.1.
The defendant Wall

claimed that he didn't see the plain-

tiff until she was 50 feet away.

Clearly he was failing to keep

a proper lookout, as she saw him when they were separated by
over 300 feet, and because he was sitting higher in the truck
as he came up over the hill he had the best opportunity of
seeing her first.

Clearly the jury should not have been allowed

to find that plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care to
keep a lookout for defendant's truck.
While the plaintiff controlled her vehicle to the right
of center, the defendant did not.

The jury should not tave been

allmved to speculate that plaintiff failed to keep her vehicle
under reasonable control.

Furthermore, in the instruction the

jur; were authorized to find that either or both defendant and
plaintiff were guilty of speeding.

There was no evidence in

the record of speed on the part of either driver, both operating
their vehicles on a clear dry day within the speed limit, and
there was no evidence that excessive speed could have been a
proximate cause of the collision.
On the fourth ground of negligence set forth in the instruction, the jury was

authorized to find that the plaintiff drove

her vehicle on the wrong side of the road, and there was no
believable evidence upon which such a finding could be based.
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POINT
THE

COU~T

4

ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 8,

AND IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. ll AS REQUESTED WITH REGARD
TO DAMAGES.
The court altogether failed to instruct the jury on menta:'I
pain and suffering and disfigurement.

That mental pain was a

i

very substantial matter in this case is evidenced by the fact
that prior to the collision the plaintiff rvas an attractive
young woman 21 years of age, who derived a great deal of pleasun

1

and enjoyment from various athletic endeavors, including competi·l
tive racing, basketball, softball, jogging, water skiing and
snow skiing.

I

She had won trophies in horse shows and rodeo

competition, participating in barrel racing and pole leaning
events on her purebred Appalossa mare, which she had ridden froo

I
I
1

her childhood, which corresponded with its colthood.
I
She thoroughly enjoyed her chosen profession of nursing, I

and her nursing activities were most satisfactory to her super- \
visors.

A 26% permanent bodily disability preventing her from

I

I
engaging in or doing well in her chosen profession, and prevent· I
ing her from participating in the various athletic endeavors

I

which she so much enjoyed, would be particularly distressing to

I

her, and would cause her to suffer considerable mental, as well
as physical, pain throughout her reasonable life ex?ectancy of
57.7 years.
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Plaintiff's entire life style was changed and disrupted
by the injuries she sustained in the collision.

Particularly

because of the more serious injury to her left knee she has
difficulty in climbing stairs, in rising to her feet from a
seated position, and in going to a seated position.

She cannot

get down on her knees to perform housework or do other things.
When she sits down on the floor to perform some housework or
other activity she has great difficulty in getting back on her
feet.

She cannot engage in her favorite activity of horseback

riding without severe limitation and pain.

She suffered exten-

sive scarring to her face, knees, and ankle.

The removal of the

patella of her left knee radically changed its appearance and
made it so that it was not symmetrical to her right knee, and
plaintiff is sensitive about this permanent disfigurement.

With

such drastic modification of her life style, plaintiff will suffer
serious mental anguish throughout her life eX?ectancy.

The jury

certainly needed an instruction on this important fundamental
issue of mental pain and suffering in order to properly and
reasonably evaluate plaintiff's damages.

The need for such an

instruction is greatly emphasized by the apparent failure of the
jury to take such suffering into account in arriving at their
shamefully inadequate verdict.
In this connection, we desire to call the court's attention
to 22 Am Jur 2d Section 353 which states as follows:
"When the evidence established a basis for recovery for
mental anguish or other mental disturbance, the instruction should be drawn to permit the jury to consider
that element of injury in assessing the damages. In
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such cases requested instructions which deny the jury
the right to compensate for mental suffering must be
refused."
To the same effect is Bruce v. Madden, 208 Va 636, 160
S.E. 2d 137.

In that case the plaintiff >vas involved in an

accident which aggravated a previous hip condition, and the
plaintiff suffered some neck and hip pain.

The plaintiff

required more frequent injections of cortisone to relieve the
increased pain caused by the flare-up of the difficulty Hith
his hip joint.
He quote from that case as follows:
"The plaintiff offered an instruction on damages
which would have told the jury that it could consider
five separate elements listed therein in ascertaining
the amount of damages to be awarded the plaintiff.
One of those elements was contained in paragraph 4,
which was worded as follows:
'The mental Rnguish, if
any, the plaintiff has endured as a result of his
injuries.' The trial court, over the objection of
the plaintiff, struck that paragraph from the instruction ..... .
"The plaintiff, on the other hand, contended in
the trial court and contends here that the jury, from
the evidence before it, could have inferred that he
endured mental anguish as the result of the injuries
sustained in the accident of July, 1965. It was error,
therefore, the plaintiff says, for the trial court to
strike from the instruction offered by him the paragraph which would have permitted the jury to consider
mental anguish as an element of damages.
"Hith the plaintiff we agree. In Norfolk & \.J.Ry.Co.
v. Marpole, 97 Va. 594, 599, 34 S.E. 462, 464 (1899),
we considered an instruction which had been granted by
the trial court and which had been objected to because
'it allowed the jury, without special proof, in fiA~ng
the plaintiff's damages, to take into consideration
his mental suffering. ' He held that there '.vas no error
in the granting of the instruction and cited with approval the holding in the case of Brown v. Hannibal &
St. J.R. Co., 99 Mo. 310, 12 S.\v. 655 (1899), '"'here it
was stated:
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1
"
*i<i<'~< Physical pain and mental anguish usually,
and to some extent, necessarily, flow from, or attend,
bodily injuries. It is not necessary to make specific
proof of pain and mental anguish. These elements of
damages are sufficiently shown by the evidence which
discloses the nature, character and extent of the
injuries. From such evidence the ~u~ rna~ infer pain
and mental anguish. 1 [Emphasis ad e .)
9 Mo., at
318-319, 12 s.tv., at 656 ....

"[1, 2] Thus, it is well settled in this jurisdiction that mental anguish may be inferred in those
instances where such would be the natural and probable
consequence of bodily injury and that it is error in
such a situation to refuse to instruct the jury that
it may consider mental anguish as an element of damages.
"Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is reasonable to state that
he sustained, in the accident in question, an aggravation of his pre-existing hip injury, causing severe
pain and marked loss of motion. He became restless,
unable to sleep, and hampered in his employment. He
was required to undergo additional treatment and to
take "pain pills." The plaintiff also sustained an
injury to his neck, causing pain and requiring treatment
of an unpleasant nature.
"From all of this, the jury would have been justified
in inferring that the plaintiff endured mental anguish
as the result of his injuries and would have been warranted in awarding a reasonable amount to cover that
element of damages. It was error, therefore, to withhold the element of mental anguish from the jury's
consideration."
Plaintiff respectfully contends that the elements of mental
pain and anguish were far greater in the case at bar than in the
Virginia case above cited.
The element of permanent disfigurement is also conspicuously absent from the court's instruction No. 8, although this
serious element of damage was covered in plaintiff's requested
instruction No. 11.
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See also King v. Britt, N.C. 148 N.E. 2d 594 (1966).
We quote from that case at page 598:
"Plaintiff did not testify that she suffered any
mental pain or anguish or embarrassment or humiliation because of the permanent scar on her forehead.
However, as a general rule, in personal injury cases
where mental pain and suffering form an element of
recovery damages by reason of mutilation or disfigurement of the person, direct proof of such pain and
suffering is not necessary, but it may be inferred
by the jury from the facts of the case or there may
be substantial evidence from which the jury may imply
its existence. Muse v. Ford Motor Co., Supra 25A,
C.J.S. Damages Section 162 (7) p. 100. In our opinion,
and we so hold, plaintiff's evidence would pe~it a
jury to infer and find that the permanent scar on
appellant's forehead caused leer to suffer mental pain.
"Nowhere in the charge did the court instruct the
jury that they could award damages for mental pain
and suffering .... The assignments of error to the
charge are good. The judge should have charged the
jury that if they found from appellant's evidence that
appellant suffered mental pain as a result of the
permanent scar on her forehead, negligently inflicted
by the defendant's tort, as he admitted, this mental
pain should be considered by the jury as an element
of actual or compensatory damage in passing on the
issue submitted to them. The trial court is required
to charge the law upon all substantial features of
the case arising on the evidence even though there is
no request for such special instructions .....
"For prejudicial error in the charge appellent is
entitled to a new trial."
See also Pestotnik v. Balliet, (Iowa) 10 N.W. 2d 99;
Southweld v. DeBoer (Neb) 80

N. W.

2d 8 77;

f.'!ullendore v.

Genu;:

I

(Ho.) 377 S.W. 2d 494.
TI1is court has also recognized this principle in
Kirkendall 261 P. 2d 670 (1953).

Paul~

In that case an instruction

allowing plaintiff compensation "for any pain, discomfort, fes:j
I
anxiety, and other mental and emotional distress" \vas approv2.::
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36

the court noting that the permanency of plaintiff's disability
in that case would indicate limitation of the enjoyment of prior
habits of work and recreation.

POINT

5

THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY WERE GROSSLY
INADEQUATE, AND THE JURY DISREGARDED THE GREAT
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE INSTRUCTIONS
OF THE COURT IN THE AMOUNT AWARDED FOR DAMAGES.
It is inconceivable that the jury could have given fair
and proper consideration to the evidence regarding the extensive
injury and permanent disability and suffering of the plaintiff
in fixing general damages at $10,000, particularly when they
were told by the court in its instruction No. 8 that their
assessment of general damages should take into account the
nature, character, extent, and severity of her injuries, past
and future pain, suffering, impairment of bodily functions,
disability, impairment of earning capacity, and future medical
and hospital expenses.
It was stipulated by the plaintiff that the plaintiff
would incur future medical and hospital expenses in connection
with the scheduled Spring operation in the amount of $2,134.80.
Her continuing disability at the time of the trial, and through
the recovery period from the scheduled operation, would involve
a minimum loss of earnings of $4,500 (six months at $9,000 per
year.)

The jury's verdict would leave her with approximately

SJ,SOO to cover all bodily disability, pain, suffering, loss of
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functions, permanent impairment of her enjoyment of life, her
ability to perform household duties, and enjoyment of recreational activity throughout her 57.7 years of reasonable life
expectancy.

This $3,500 is also supposed to cover all of her

mental pain and suffering related to these various disabilities

I

and to the permanent substantial disfigurement of her knees and',
ankle.

The amount awarded plaintiff for general damages by

the jury's verdict would not cover a small part of the damages
she suffered through loss of future earnings and through permanent impairment of her earning capacity alone, without regard
to all the other elements of compensatory

da~Ege.

Dr. Chapman, who had the principal treatment of the
plaintiff after the first operation, measured her permanent
disability of the body as a whole at 26%.

It is true that

Dr. Spencer, testifying on behalf of the defendants, after one
examination placed her permanent bodily disability at 18%, but
Dr. Spencer did not allow any disability for the right knee or
right ankle, both of which

~vere

permanently impaired.

Plaintiff suffered the shattering of the oatella on both
knees.

The orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Mendenhall, stated that

heroic attempts should be made to preserve the patella because
of the levers it applies and the mechanical advantage it ~novicie1
making the muscles of the thigh more efficient and enabling

t~J

better straightening of the leg which is useful in kneeling,
climbing stairs, and performing many functions of daily livi::1:
as

~vell

as its

i~portance

athletically.

He stated that all
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bending of the knee would be affected by the removal of the
patella (R. 292).

Dr. Mendenhall did in fact make a heroic

attempt to preserve the patella by the surgery he performed on
both knees, but it became necessary for another orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Chapman, to subsequently remove the patella on the
left knee almost a year later, and Dr. Mendenhall at the time
of the trial had scheduled further surgery in the Spring on
the plaintiff's left knee.
Dr. Chapman also stated that the X-rays taken by him on
June 19, 1978 (Exhibit 30) showed arthritic change in the talarnavicular and subtalae joints, indicating hastened arthritis of
these joints due to the injuries (R. 304).

The arthritic pro-

blem in the right foot and ankle observed clinically and by X-ray
examination by Dr. Chapman vindicated Dr. Mendenhall's assertion
that this type of injury often results in early arthritis (R.287).
The defendants witness, Dr. Spencer, did not dispute Dr. Chapman's
diagnosis of hastened arthritis shown by Exhibit 30.
To compensate plaintiff for

~er

economic loss in the

permanent impairment of her earning capacity, loss of future
earnings, need to forsake her chosen vocation and qualify herself
for alternative work, would require a verdict several times larger
than the award given by the jury without any regard to her physical
and mental pain and permanent disability.

Truly, the judicial

conscience of the trial court should have been shocked by the
verdict's gross inadequacy.

Perhaps the jurors' indifference to

the evidence in this regard is partially attributable to or manifested by the fact that three of them slept at various times
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during the trial.

In any event, the jury certainly disregardec

the evidence and disregarded the instructions of the court in '
their assessment of both general and special damages.
judicial approval to such a flagrant miscarriage of

To give

justice~~

do violence to the principles of justice which all courts have,

i

duty to preserve.
In Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P. 2d 176, the
court granted a new trial in 1940 when the jury only allowed
general damages for the wrongful death of a 30-year old son

I

WI

~Vit

I

a life expectancy of 35 years.
Plaintiff does not contend that the court should disrega:
a jury verdict simply because he would have acted differently '
under the evidence.

Of course, it is the duty of the court to

give proper regard to the fact finding prerogative of the jury.
In his special concurring opinion in Holmes v. Nelson,
7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P. 2d 722, Justice Crockett makes a comment
';vhich we think applicable here.

He quote from page 441 of the

Utah Reports:
"If the trial court is to fulfill his function of
maintaining general supervision over litigation to see
that justice is done, it is necessary that he have the
power to set aside verdicts and grant ne~v trials when
that objective is not served. But such prerogative
should be exercised with caution and forbearance consistent with his important and imperative duty to safeguard the right of trial by jury. The verdict, vJ~f'~
supported hv substantial evidence, should be regarded
as presumptively correct and should not be interfered
with merely because the judge mig~t disagree with the
result. The prerogati·ve should onl;r be exercised when,
in the view of the trial court, it seems clear that the
jury has nisapplied or failed to take into account
proven facts; or misunderstood or disre~arded the law;
or made findings clearly against the weight of the
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I

_.,j,.

evidence so that the verdict is offensive to his sense
of justice to the extent that he cannot in good conscience permit it to stand."
In the case of Badon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P. 2d
326, the Supreme Court overruled the trial court's denial of a

motion for new trial and granted a new trial unless the defendant
would accept an additur to $500.

In that case the jury had

awarded the plaintiff $100 general damages upon evidence which
showed that the plaintiff had eaten some contaminated sausage
from which he contracted trichinosis with no substantial injury.
He was not hospitalized.

He lost $55 for a week's wages and

$14 doctor bill, or a total of $69 of out-of-pocket damage,
which left him $31 as general damages for pain, distress and
inconvenience of having the disease.
We quote from the decision at page 45 of Utah Reports:
"[3] We are not here concerned with any question as
to whether the disparity in the verdict is so gross as
to indicate that the whole verdict is so suffused with
passion and prejudice that it should ~e entirely set
aside. The contention here is that the verdict is outside the limits of what appears justifiable under the
evidence to the extent that it should not be permitted
to stand. In such instances the remedy is to order a
modification of the verdict to bring it within the evidence; and the adverse party is given the choiGe
of accepting it or taking a new trial. This alternative
does not infringe upon the right of trial by jury, because the party favored by the orde~ has had his trial
by jury and is seeking relief from the inadequacy of the
jury verdict, while the party adversely affected always
can choose the new trial if he so desires .....
"That the same rule as to setting aside or modifying
a verdict for excessiveness of damages should also ap?ly
to inadequacy is indicated in the language of the recent
case of P9.ul v. ;~ir'cencocll. Th~s c::mrt, t;-:.:::-ou;h :::':lief
Justice ~Donou2h, said:
"'If inadeauacv or excessiveness of ti1e verdict

*"~<*

shO'"~S a disregard '"''"'' of the evidence or the instruc-

tione
***
toLawsatisfy
the
courtprovided
that
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was rendered under such disregard or misapprehension of the evidence or influence of passions or
prejudice, then the court may exercise its discretion in the interest of justice and grant a new
trial'.
citing Saltas v. Affleck, ~vherein tacit approval was
given to an order of the trial court directing that an
award of $800 for the death of plaintiff's son be increased to $2,400, which the defendant was directed to
accept or take a new trial .....
"We affirm the responsibility of this court to be
indulgent toward the verdict of the jury, and not to
disturb it so long as it is within the bounds of reason,
in accordance with the principJ es set forth in the con>panion case of Schneider v. Suhr~ann; and also that it
is prill1arily the prerogative and the duty of the trial
court to pass upon the adequacy of the verdict and to
order any necessary modification thereof. Nevertheless,
when the verdict is outside the limits of any reasonable
appraisal of dama.ges as shown by the evidence, it should
not be permitted to stand, and if the trial court fails
to rectify it, we are obliged to make the correction
on appeal."
The above case is the only case 'lve have found \vherein tht
Supreme Court, in the interest of justice, reversed the judgmen:
of the trivl court and made an additur on its mm as a conditior
to the granting of a new trial.

Certainly in this case the

trii

court had a wide discretion to rrtake an appropriate additur to ti'
shockingly inadequate jury award; and the court, in the exerds1
of its judicial conscience had the right and the duty to IT'ake ar
appropriate addition to the jury verdict.
In this case the jury miserably failed in its fact-findir:l
duty; it disregarded the evidence presented to it; and it clear i
failed to follow the court's instructions.

\,'e respectfull:,•

I

submit that the trial court fa::.led in its duty to grant a nei·J I
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I

trial.

The jury system, long venerated in this country, is best

served when a verdict unworthy of respect is set aside.

This

court is not required to dignify with its ratification a verdict
which shocks the judicial conscience.
POINT

6

THE JURY ERRED IN THE AWARDING OF SPECIAL DAMAGES
The court in its instruction included the loss of earnings from the date of injury to the date of trial as an item of
special damage.

Plaintiff's undisputed loss of earnings during

this time amounted to $7,426.40.

It was stipulated that plain-

tiff's medical and hospital expenses up to the tin1e of the trial
totaled $8,335.08.
The amount of special damages awarded by the jury should
therefore have been $15,761.48, rather than the amount of

$15,000.

The deficiency in the amount aw·arded by the jury for

special damages should have been corrected by the trial judge to
conform to the undisputed evidence in that respect.

CONCLUSION
For the various reasons set forth in this brief, the plaintiff was deprived of a fair trial in the court below.

We respect-

fully urge this court in the furtherance of justice to grant a
new trial to the plaintiff, and to order that the new trial be
lirrited to the jssue of damages only, with appropriate directions
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to the trial court to instruct the jury adequately on all
pensable injuries sustained by the plaintiff, particularly

co~
wi~

respect to mental pain and suffering.
Respectfully subrritted,
HOODROH D. \;'lUTE

2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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